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As the Chain Event Graph (CEG) has a topology which represents sets of conditional
independence statements, it becomes especially useful when problems lie naturally
in a discrete asymmetric non-product space domain, or when much context-speciﬁc
information is present. In this paper we show that it can also be a powerful represen-
tational tool for a wide variety of causal hypotheses in such domains. Furthermore, we
demonstrate that, as with Causal Bayesian Networks (CBNs), the identiﬁability of the effects
of causal manipulations when observations of the system are incomplete can be veriﬁed
simply by reference to the topology of the CEG. We close the paper with a proof of a Back
Door Theorem for CEGs, analogous to Pearl’s Back Door Theorem for CBNs.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Much recent work in the ﬁeld of causality has focused on how cause relates to control, and the analysis of controlled
models. Here, with the advocates of this approach we assume the existence of a background idle system which is then
subjected to some sort of intervention or manipulation.
The Bayesian Network (BN) is the most commonly used graphical tool for representing complex dependency relation-
ships. Interpreting the directionality of the edges of the BN as causal leads to the Causal Bayesian Network (CBN), which
uses a non-parametric representation based on structural equation models [12,19,21,30]. CBNs provide a framework for
expressing assertions about what might happen when the system under study is externally manipulated and some of its
variables are assigned certain values.
BNs and CBNs are ideal for problems which admit a natural product space structure. However many processes do not
have this — they are asymmetric in the sense that measurement variables may have different collections of possible out-
comes given different vectors of values for sets of ancestral variables. For a variety of examples see [4,1,10,16,2,17,23].
Context-speciﬁc variants of BNs exist [2,26,23,18], usually with tree-structured conditional probability tables annexed to the
vertices of the BN to allow for the analysis of context-speciﬁc independence properties. Although these graphs allow the
analyst a greater ﬂexibility than unmodiﬁed BNs, they are still ineﬃcient representations of processes (such as treatment
regimes) whose unfolding depends on the state of the system at any particular point and the values of speciﬁc covariates at
that point. Similarly, they are not ideal representations of problems where no outcomes of certain variables could logically
occur given some vectors of values of ancestral variables.
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these). The basic Do intervention of Pearl [19] has been extended to functional manipulations (Do X = g(Z)), and stochastic
manipulations which assign a new probability distribution to the state space of the manipulated variable. Nonetheless, at
the most primitive level a manipulation of a BN still corresponds to the setting of certain measurement variables to speciﬁc
values, possibly following some rule or policy. However, whereas the effects of a cause can be reasonably represented by a
random variable, at times the speciﬁcation of a cause as the value of a random variable can be artiﬁcial. Causes are more
naturally represented as conditioning events, and such conditioning is not elegantly expressed in the BN. An analogous case
is made by Dawid [5] who argues that causes are decisions and not decision rules.
Although topologically complex, event trees (the elicitation of which often provides the ﬁrst stage in the development
of a model) explicitly acknowledge structural asymmetries — context-speciﬁc and sample space information is embedded
in the topology of the tree. Their semantics are also often closer to many verbal descriptions of the world, especially when
those descriptions revolve around how things happen rather than how the world appears. Event trees however, cannot be
readily interrogated for the conditional independence structure of a model.
Trees also have their advocates in the study of causality [27,30,25]. In the related ﬁeld of decision analysis, French and
Insua [11] argue that the advantages of inﬂuence diagrams over decision trees are illusory, and point out that asymmetric
problems in which a particular choice of action at a decision node makes available different choices of action at subsequent decision
nodes than those available after an alternative choice are the rule rather than the exception. Using trees we can also choose
the level of detail we include in our representation, and this can be dependent on what we intend to do to the system.
We can incorporate context speciﬁc information that is informative about various causal hypotheses (see for example [8]).
This is particularly useful in models of biological regulatory mechanisms, which typically contain many noisy and and or
gates [28].
In [28] we introduced an alternative graphical model — the Chain Event Graph (CEG), constructed from an event tree
together with a set of exchangeability assumptions. It can be seen as a generalisation of a probability graph [3,27], and
typically has many fewer nodes than the original tree. The CEG retains those characteristics of the event tree which allow
for the representation of asymmetric problems; but they are also more ﬂexible and useful, since their nodes represent
intrinsic events in the problem and their edges dependencies between them. They express topologically all the conditional
independence structure associated with a problem (this is not bolted on as with context-speciﬁc BNs), and also any sample
space information generated by the asymmetry of the problem. So in a non-causal context, CEGs provide a more expressive
(if somewhat more complicated) topological framework for expressing collections of conditional independence statements
than the discrete BN.
We present here an extension of CEG models which provides a framework for causal reasoning. We believe this extension
to be as transparent and compelling as the extension from BNs to CBNs. In Section 2 we give a brief deﬁnition of the CEG
and a description of how to read conditional independence properties from it. This section also contains an example of how
an asymmetric problem can be depicted using such a graph. Section 3 introduces the manipulation of these graphs, and this
theory is developed in Section 4 where we address the identiﬁcation of the effects of manipulations. Section 5 introduces a
Back Door Theorem for CEGs, a generalisation of Pearl’s Back Door Theorem for BNs [21].
2. Chain Event Graphs
2.1. Deﬁnition
We provide here a brief deﬁnition and description of the CEG. A more comprehensive deﬁnition can be found in [28].
The CEG is a function of an event tree [27], and we begin this section with a brief description of this graph. An event tree
T is a directed, rooted tree, with vertex set V (T ) and edge set E(T ). The non-leaf vertices are called situations and the set
of situations S(T ). The root-to-leaf paths {λ} of T form the atoms of the event space (called the path σ -algebra of T ), and
label the different possible unfoldings of the described process. Events measurable with respect to this space are unions of
these atoms.
Each situation v serves as an index of a random variable X(v) whose values describe the next stage of possible de-
velopments of the unfolding process. The state space X(v) of X(v) can be identiﬁed both with the set of directed edges
e(v, v ′) ∈ E(T ) emanating from v in T and the set of end-nodes v ′ ∈ V (T ) of these edges. For each X(v) (v ∈ S(T ))
we let
Π(v) ≡ {π(v ′ ∣∣ v) ∣∣ v ′ ∈X(v)}
where π(v ′ | v) ≡ P (X(v) = v ′) are called the primitive probabilities of the tree; and
Π(T ) ≡ {Π(v)}v∈S(T )
A full speciﬁcation of the probability model is given by (T ,Π(T )).
We extend Shafer’s deﬁnition of an event tree by the introduction of three further properties — coloured edges, stages
and positions.
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1. Two situations v1 and v2 are in the same stage u if X(v1) and X(v2) have the same distribution under some bijection
ψ between their sample spaces. We label the set of stages of the tree T by L(T ).
2. For v1, v2 ∈ u (for some stage u), the edges e(v1, v1′) and e(v2, v2′) have the same colour if e(v1, v1′) maps to e(v2, v2′)
under this bijection ψ , and π(v2′ | v2) = π(v1′ | v1).
3. Two situations v1 and v2 are in the same position w if for each subpath emanating from v1, the ordered sequence of
colours is the same as that for some subpath emanating from v2. We label the set of positions of the tree T by K (T ).
So two situations are in the same stage when the immediate future evolution from both situations is governed by the
same probability law. Two situations are in the same position when the entire future evolution from both situations is
governed by the same probability law.
Deﬁnition 2. The Chain Event Graph C (a function of a tree T ) is the coloured mixed graph with vertex set V (C), directed
edge set Ed(C) and undirected edge set Eu(C) deﬁned by:
1. V (C) ≡ K (T ) ∪ {w∞}.
2. (a) For w,w ′ ∈ V (C) \ {w∞}, there exists a directed edge e(w,w ′) ∈ Ed(C) iff there are situations v, v ′ ∈ S(T ) such
that v ∈ w ∈ K (T ), v ′ ∈ w ′ ∈ K (T ) and there is an edge from v to v ′ in E(T ).
(b) For w ∈ V (C)\{w∞}, there exists a directed edge e(w,w∞) ∈ Ed(C) iff there is a situation v ∈ S(T ) and a leaf-node
v ′ of T such that v ∈ w ∈ K (T ) and there is an edge from v to v ′ in E(T ).
3. For w1,w2 ∈ V (C), there exists an undirected edge e(w1,w2) ∈ Eu(C) iff there are situations v1, v2 ∈ S(T ) such that
v1 ∈ w1 ∈ K (T ), v2 ∈ w2 ∈ K (T ) but v1, v2 are members of the same stage u for some u ∈ L(T ). We say that w1 and
w2 are in the same stage u, and label the set of stages of C by L(C).
4. If v ∈ w ∈ K (T ), v ′ ∈ w ′ ∈ K (T ) and there is an edge from v to v ′ in E(T ), then the edge e(w,w ′) ∈ Ed(C) has the
same colour as the edge e(v, v ′).
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the root-to-leaf paths in T and the root-to-sink paths in C . Each atom of
T becomes a path λ(w0,w∞) in C , and these paths form the atoms of the σ -algebra of the CEG. Events in C are unions
of w0 → w∞ paths. We write w ≺ w ′ when the position w precedes the position w ′ on a w0 → w∞ path. We call w a
parent of w ′ if there exists an edge e(w,w ′) ∈ Ed(C). A collection W of positions w ∈ V (C) is called a ﬁne cut of C if all
w0 → w∞ paths in C pass through exactly one w ∈ W .
When the set of stages L(T ) of an event tree is identical to the set of positions K (T ), we call the resultant CEG C simple.
Simple CEGs have no undirected edges and since the colouring is therefore redundant, they can be treated as directed
acyclic graphs. An example of a simple CEG can be found in [33].
Each stage u in our CEG C serves as an index of a random variable X(u) whose values describe the next stage of
possible developments of the unfolding process. The state space X(u) of X(u) can be identiﬁed with the set of directed
edges e(w,w ′) ∈ Ed(C) emanating from any w ∈ u. For each X(u) we let
Π(u) ≡ {π(e(w,w ′) ∣∣ w) ∣∣ w ∈ u} and Π(C) ≡ {Π(u)}u∈L(C)
A full speciﬁcation of the probability model is given by (C,Π(C)).
2.2. Conditional independence
The conditional independence properties of a model can be read rapidly from the topology of a CEG-representation of
the model.
For a stage u ∈ L(C), let the event which is the union of all w0 → w∞ paths passing through some w ∈ u be labelled
Λ(u), and let Z(u) be a variable whose state space Z(u) can be identiﬁed with the set of w0 → w ∈ u subpaths. Then as
shown in [28] we have that
X(u) 
 Z(u) | Λ(u)
which can be read as — X(u) is independent of any variable deﬁned upstream of u, given the event Λ(u).
So, if we know that a unit has reached some stage u, then we do not need to know how our unit reached u (i.e. along
which w0 → w ∈ u subpath) in order to predict how the process is going to unfold in the immediate future (i.e. along
which edge leaving w ∈ u our unit is going to proceed). In a BN the analogous result is that we need only the vector of
values taken by a variable’s parents in order to predict the value taken by that variable.
For a position w ∈ V (C), let the event which is the union of all w0 → w → w∞ paths be labelled Λ(w), let Y (w) be
a variable whose state space Y(w) can be identiﬁed with the set of w → w∞ subpaths, and let Z(w) be a variable whose
state space Z(w) can be identiﬁed with the set of w0 → w subpaths. Then (from [28]) we have that
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 Z(w) | Λ(w)
which can be read as — variables deﬁned downstream of w are independent of variables deﬁned upstream, given the event Λ(w).
So, if we know that a unit has reached some position w , then we do not need to know how our unit reached w in order
to predict how the process is going to behave during its complete future unfolding (i.e. along which subpath emanating
from w our unit is going to pass). In a BN the analogous result is that in order to predict the vector of values taken by a
set of variables X, we need to know the vector of values of the set pa(X) \ X.
If a model can be depicted by a BN then in our CEG of this model we can combine these position and stage-based
expressions to give us exactly the same set of conditional independence statements that we could deduce from the BN
(see [28]). However, as noted in Section 1, in many applications our processes are highly asymmetric, and model elicitation
produces asymmetric event trees with event spaces not admitting a natural product space structure. In such cases a CEG-
depiction of the problem embeds context-speciﬁc conditional independence properties within the topology of the graph
(which is not the case with BNs), and allows the analyst to deduce other context-speciﬁc properties that might not be
apparent before the elicitation process is undertaken. The examples below illustrate these points.
We believe that the Markov property will prove to be complete with respect to the class of independence properties
presented here and in [31,28], but this is a topic for a future paper.
2.3. An example
This section contains an example of a model with the type of asymmetric structure described above. For simplicity the
problem variables in this example are all binary and in the form of indicators — something happens or it doesn’t.
Example 2.1. The police hold a suspect S whom they believe threw a brick through a shop window and stole a quantity of
money. They wish to bring S to court, but there may be reasons for them not proceeding (such as the lack of availability
of a judge; police-force policy on the amount of money needing to be stolen before they are prepared to pay for forensic
testing, or take suspects to court etc.). Whether they proceed or not can be thought of as outcomes of an indicator X1.
It is uncertain that the suspect was present at the scene when the money was stolen (indicator X2), that he was the
individual who threw the brick and stole the money (indicator X3), that the forensic service will ﬁnd glass matching the
window glass on the clothing of S (indicator X4), that a witness W will identify S (indicator X5), and whether S will be
convicted or released (the effect indicator of interest X6).
We could construct our event tree and hence our CEG in temporal order so that edges representing the outcomes of
X2 and X3 preceded those associated with X1. However, if we suppose that we are constructing our tree through eliciting
information from members of the police force then X1 is the ﬁrst indicator of interest. In this our method is similar to that
used in the construction of decision trees in decision analysis [29].
Unless S is identiﬁed by the witness W , then S will not be convicted. The glass match is believed only to depend on
whether S threw the brick; and the quality of the witness identiﬁcation is believed to depend only on whether S was at
the scene of the crime or not. This is suﬃcient information for us to construct a CEG for the problem. Our CEG is given in
Fig. 1, where for simplicity only a subset of the edges in Ed(C) have been coloured.
As the reasons which might lead to the police not proceeding are not related to their beliefs about S ’s presence at the
crime scene etc., we can see that the probabilities associated with edges labelled present, not present, stole money, did not
steal money are unaffected by whether they succeed edges labelled proceed or not proceed. Hence the positions w1 and w2
in Fig. 1 are in the same stage (and so connected by an undirected edge), as are the positions w3 and w4. The position
w3 represents the history (proceed, present). S could only have thrown the brick if he was present at the scene, so edges
labelled present are succeeded by edges labelled stole money, did not, but edges labelled not present are not.
If the police do not proceed, then forensic evidence is not collected, and as S is not taken to court, W will not be asked
to testify. Hence there are no edges labelled glass match, no match, identiﬁes S or does not on w0 → w∞ paths starting with
the edge not proceed.
The success of the forensic test being dependent only on whether or not S threw the brick tells us that the positions w6
and w7 are in the same stage (and hence connected by an undirected edge). The quality of identiﬁcation being dependent
only on whether S was at the crime scene or not tells us that the positions w8 and w9 are in the same stage, and that the
positions w10 and w11 are in the same stage.
If W does not identify S (position w13), then the probability of conviction is zero, and there is only one edge
e(w13,w∞). If W does identify S , then the probability of conviction depends on whether the forensic test was successful
(position w12) or not (position w14). This last is not explicit in what the police have told us, but is apparent from the fact
that the police would not pay for the forensic test if it was not going to be any use to them in the case.
The detailing above of the possible developments of the case amounts to a description of the conditional independence
structure of the problem, and clearly most of the information provided is context-speciﬁc. Fig. 1 illustrates the fact that we
are explicitly using the topology of the CEG to express the resulting asymmetric dependency structure.
We can of course represent this problem using a BN by adding dummy outcomes to the sets of possible outcomes of
variables X3, X4 and X5, and imposing a product space structure onto the problem. The BN would have to be supplemented
by context-speciﬁc conditional independence information, but there are methods for doing this [2,23].
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Fig. 2. Three possible BNs for Example 2.1.
The problem with such an approach is that our BN will then be ill-deﬁned. If we add a third possible outcome to the
pairs of outcomes already present for X3, X4, X5 (signifying that the conditions for Xi taking either of its current values
have not been met), and add edges representing these outcomes to the subpaths leaving w2 and w4 and terminating in w13,
then we can use the resultant CEG to establish the following conditional independence properties involving the variable X5:
X5 
 (X3, X4) | (X1, X2) (1)
X5 
 (X1, X3) | (X2, X4) (2)
X5 
 (X1, X2) | (X3, X4) (3)
Coupling each of these in turn with the properties relating to X1, X2, X3, X4 and X6, we can draw three different BNs
(shown in Fig. 2), but there is no single BN for this problem which depicts all three properties. We could choose one of the
BNs in Fig. 2 and supplement it with context-speciﬁc information, but this is not ideal.
Now we have already noted that our CEG could be drawn in a different order, so the CEG-representation of a problem
is also not unique. But the difference here is that the conditional independence structure of a problem is encoded in the
topology of the CEG, and can easily be read from the graph if it is constructed in an order wherein problem variables
always appear before their descendants. Furthermore, if the CEG is constructed in such an order, then by supplementing
the model with some additional assumptions discussed below, it has a causal interpretation. We are thus able to extend the
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extended to give a CBN.
3. Manipulating the Chain Event Graph
3.1. Principles
In this section we deﬁne what we mean by a manipulation of a CEG, and in Section 3.2 we show how such manipulations
relate to interventions on BNs.
A CEG provides a ﬂexible framework for expressing what might happen were a model to be manipulated or made subject
to some control. Such a manipulation results in a modiﬁcation (usually a simpliﬁcation) of the topology of our (idle) CEG to
produce a manipulated CEG. For many manipulations this modiﬁcation consists simply of the pruning (removing) of speciﬁed
edges and positions and the reassignment of the probabilities on a small subset of the directed edges of the CEG.
Discussions of causal manipulation can be found in [13,21,27,30]. Here we follow Pearl [21] whose Do operator describes
interventions on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). The joint density function of a set of random variables X1, . . . , Xn with
sample spaces X1, . . . ,Xn factorises according to a DAG as:




where p(xi | pai) is the probability of Xi taking the value xi given that its parents among X1, . . . , Xn take values from
x1, . . . , xn .
A random variable is forced to assume a speciﬁc value with probability one, say X j = xˆ j for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and
xˆ j ∈X j . A new density p(· ‖ xˆ j) (using the notation of [15]) is deﬁned on {X1, . . . , Xn} \ {X j} by the formula:
p(x1, . . . , x j−1, x j+1, . . . , xn ‖ xˆ j) ≡ p(x1, . . . , xn)
p(x j | pa j) (3.1)
This formula expresses the effect of the manipulation Do X j = xˆ j . The distribution of the variable X j has been replaced by
a new one which assigns the whole weight to the value x j . The expression can be readily modiﬁed for say a stochastic
intervention by replacing the distribution of X j by some other (less crude) new distribution. The manipulation of CEGs is
deﬁned in an analogous manner by the replacing of the distributions of some of the random variables sitting on positions
by new distributions.
Deﬁnition 3. Let (T ,Π(T )) be a tree with corresponding CEG (C,Π(C)). Let D ⊂ S(T ) be a subset of the situations of the
tree, and ΠˆD ≡ {πˆ (v ′ | v): v ∈ D, v ′ ∈X(v)} be a new distribution on v ∈ D . Then we deﬁne a manipulation of our tree by:
Pˆ
(
X(v) = v ′)≡
{
π(v ′ | v) v /∈ D
πˆ (v ′ | v) v ∈ D
for all v ′ ∈ X(v), v ∈ S(T ). The manipulated tree (Tˆ , Πˆ(Tˆ )) is the tree so deﬁned, and the manipulated CEG (Cˆ, Πˆ(Cˆ)) is
the CEG of the manipulated tree.
Deﬁnition 4. A manipulation of a tree is called positioned if the partition of the positions after the manipulation is equal to
or a coarsening of the partition before manipulation. It is called staged if the partition of the stages after the manipulation
is equal to or a coarsening of the partition before manipulation.
A positioned manipulation of a tree treats all sample units identically when their future development distributions are
identical. A staged manipulation treats sample units identically if their next development in the idle system is the same. In
our experience, it is usually suﬃcient to restrict study to positioned manipulations. We note that the simple Do, functional
and stochastic interventions on a BN considered by Pearl [19,20] are all both positioned and staged.
Useful manipulations of any system tend to be local in the sense that only a small number of components are ma-
nipulated. This idea is formalised in Deﬁnition 3 where only a subset of edges of a tree or CEG have their probabilities
reassigned. Where a manipulation of a CEG corresponds to a simple Do or a functional intervention, one edge only on each
root-to-sink path will have its probability altered (to either 0 or 1). This intervention can also be considered as a manipu-
lation to a set of positions W — those positions that terminate the edges which have been assigned a probability of one.
Such a manipulation could be, for example, the assignment of patients with particular values of a set of covariates (detailed
by their current positions) to a particular treatment regime (a set of subsequent positions W ).
For interventions of this type, the conditional independence properties characterised by the stage-structure both up-
stream and downstream of the manipulation are those of the idle system. When a manipulation is to a set of positions W
where not all root-to-sink paths pass through positions which are parents of positions in W , the stage-structure downstream
of W in the manipulated graph is retained from the idle CEG, but the stage-structure upstream of W is often altered. The
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conditional independence properties associated with the edges emanating from positions that are parents of positions in W
are lost.
This has the useful consequence that for staged manipulations of a CEG we can simply replace (T ,Π(T )) by (C,Π(C)) in
Deﬁnition 3; D ⊂ S(T ) by D ⊂ L(C); ΠˆD ≡ {πˆ (v ′ | v): v ∈ D, v ′ ∈ X(v)} by ΠˆD ≡ {πˆ (e(w,w ′) | w): w ∈ u, u ∈ D}, where
πˆ (e(w,w ′) | w) is a new distribution of the random variable X(u) for w ∈ u.
Our focus in this paper is on those manipulations which have analogues for BNs. We start our description with simple
interventions which can be characterised as forcing to a manipulation set W (or as in Example 3.1, to a single position w),
where each position that is a parent of a position in W has only one child in W . We label the set of parents of positions in
W by pa(W ).
Example 3.1. In Example 2.1, consider the manipulation forced to w1 (manipulation set W = {w1},pa(W ) = {w0}), which
corresponds to ensuring that the suspect goes to court.
This assigns a probability of 1 to the edge e(w0,w1), and all vertices and edges not lying on a w0 → w1 → w∞ path
are deleted. The probabilities on all edges in our manipulated CEG Cˆ are identical to the corresponding edge-probabilities
in C except the probability on the edge e(w0,w1). Our manipulated CEG Cˆ is given in Fig. 3. As all probabilities after the
manipulation remain unchanged, we have stages as marked.
We assume that Fig. 3 shows a CEG which is valid for our manipulation. However this assumption is a substantive one.
If a judge is available, suﬃcient money has been stolen and so on, then the police, believing S to be guilty, will make a
decision to proceed. In this case our manipulated CEG is almost certainly valid. However suppose the police obtain CCTV
footage showing S to be present. Then the police will again make a decision to proceed (ensuring that there is a judge
available, and ignoring police-force policy if necessary). This can also be interpreted as a manipulation to w1, but in this
case edge-probabilities downstream of the manipulation may well change — the presence of S on CCTV footage may increase
the probability of the witness identifying S for example. This manipulation may also alter the topology of the manipulated
CEG — the witness failing to identify S may no longer result automatically in an acquittal.
The alternative manipulation, forced to w13, can be interpreted as a contingent manipulation — if the police proceed,
the witness is forced not to identify the suspect. A CEG for this intervention is given in Fig. 4.
896 P. Thwaites et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 889–909Fig. 4. Manipulated CEG Cˆ for manipulation to w13.
As the manipulation deﬁnition uses the phrase if the police proceed, there is no reason here for altering the probabilities
on the e(w2,w13) and e(w4,w13) edges, and so the stage structure is as in Fig. 4. Note that this manipulation might be
enacted by an outside manipulator, such as the suspect’s brother!
The manipulation forcing to {w12,w14} is considered in Section 5.
Example 3.2. A university has residence blocks of apartments, with two rooms each. It allocates second year students, either
English (X1 = 0) or Chinese (X1 = 1), to one of the two rooms in each apartment. The second room is allocated to a ﬁrst
year student, either English (X2 = 0) or Chinese (X2 = 1), and this is done at random. A survey has recorded that the
probability of a high satisfaction rating for students placed with another student of the same ethnicity is higher than for
students placed with another student of different ethnicity.
Recording student satisfaction via a binary indicator Y , we can draw a CEG for this problem as in Fig. 5. As with Fig. 1,
for simplicity only a subset of the edges have been coloured.
The undirected edge between w1 and w2 indicates that these positions are in the same stage and hence X2 
 X1,
reﬂecting the random allocation of ﬁrst year students to apartments. Because w1 and w2 are not combined into a single
position we can read that Y /
 X1. We can also read the positions w3 and w4 to give Y 
(X1, X2) | X1 = X2 and Y 
(X1, X2) |
X1 = X2. These expressions can be combined into the single statement Y 
(X1, X2) | |X1− X2|. Since X1
 X2 and Y depends
on both X1 and X2, the obvious BN-representation of the problem is as in Fig. 6(a). The BN would need to be supplemented
by the extra context-speciﬁc information, and if required the information that second year students are allocated before ﬁrst
years.
If we consider the intervention wherein the university places ﬁrst year students with second years of the same ethnicity,
then this would be represented on the CEG in Fig. 5 as a manipulation to the position w3. Note that this manipulation
would cause the removal of the undirected edge between w1 and w2 since X1 /
 X2 | (X1 = X2). Using the BN in Fig. 6(a)
this would be a functional manipulation Do X2 = x1; or alternatively we could redeﬁne our variable X2 so that it had
outcome space {0,1} corresponding to {ﬁrst year student has same ethnicity as second year student, ﬁrst year student has different
ethnicity from second year student}. This would give us the BN as in Fig. 6(b), and our manipulation would correspond to
forcing X2 to the value 0, with the deletion of the arc from X1 to X2. However, as with the BN in Fig. 6(a), this BN would
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have to be supplemented by extra information (here the fact that ﬁrst year students are allocated at random) in order to
fully describe the idle system.
The topology of the CEG here fully represents the idle system, and also allows us to both express our manipulation and
analyse its effects.
3.2. Interventions on CEGs and BNs
Consider again the BN from Fig. 6(a) and the CEG from Fig. 5. The BN is extended to a CBN by the assumption that the
arrows on the edges represent causal directions and mechanisms [21]. So we could for example force X2 to the value 1,
and analyse the effect on the variable Y . In the CEG we cannot make this assumption about edges — X1 edges immediately
precede X2 edges in Fig. 5, but X1 is not a cause of X2. But by embedding additional causal hypotheses CEGs can be given a
causal interpretation in a very similar manner. Under this interpretation the CEG represents a controlled model where some
or all of our variables are manipulable.
For a CEG to be causal for a particular manipulation we require that all edges that are to be manipulated lie upstream
of any descendants of the variables labelling these edges. We also require that if the CEG were to be manipulated then the
assumption that the distribution of variables downstream of the manipulation remains as in the idle system is a valid one.
In Example 3.1 we brieﬂy considered a case where this assumption might not be valid. Effectively, a CEG is deemed valid
for a manipulation if the assumptions required for Deﬁnition 3 are valid.
It is therefore possible for a CEG to have a causal interpretation when not all problem variables appear before their
descendants. It is however necessary that the variables to be manipulated satisfy this condition.
If the assumptions required for Deﬁnition 3 are valid for a particular CEG C , then a manipulation of this CEG is, in its
most general form, the imposition of new probability distributions on the edges leaving one or more positions from V (C).
So for example, in Fig. 5 the manipulation Do X1 = 0 assigns a probability of 1 to the edge e(w0,w1), a probability of 0 to
the edge e(w0,w2), and leaves all other edge-probabilities unchanged. In practice we would prune the edge e(w0,w2) and
the edges emanating from w2 to give a less cluttered diagram.
Clearly the assumptions required for Deﬁnition 3 may not be valid for all possible CEG orderings of a problem. We may
have two CEGs which both accurately describe the idle state of a problem, but only one of which can be given a causal
interpretation for a particular manipulation. Indeed the choice of ordering will be governed by how we wish to use the CEG.
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provide an accurate description of how a problem unfolds, but to perform an optimal decision analysis, one would need to
have an extensive form decision tree.
All the standard interventions on BNs [21,34] are possible on CEGs, and correspond to manipulations of collections of
positions. For example the simple Do intervention becomes a manipulation of collections of stages, so in models where it
is reasonable to talk about manipulating a variable X , the intervention Do X = x0 assigns a probability of 1 to all edges
labelled x0, a probability of 0 to all edges labelled x j ( j = 0), and leaves all other edge-probabilities unchanged. In practice
we prune edges with zero probability and those lying only on zero-probability paths.
Positions in a CEG store vectors of values of preceding variables, so a set of positions whose emanating edges all share
the same labels can be partitioned by the values taken by a subset of the preceding variables. A functional manipulation
Do X = g(Z) can then be represented by assigning probabilities to the emanating edges of these positions dependent on
which element of the partition the position falls into. A stochastic Do is represented simply by assigning a new probability
distribution to all the edges leaving each position in a set whose members’ emanating edges share the same labels.
Deﬁnition 3 allows us to look beyond these basic manipulations. So for example they can all be extended so that the
manipulated variable (X ) no longer corresponds to one of the original measurement variables of the problem. The stochastic
Do can also be adapted so that for some positions corresponding to X , the distribution imposed on the outgoing edges
is identical to that in the idle system. This leads to the case where some root-to-sink paths of the CEG have no edges
manipulated, corresponding for example to treatment regimes where only patients with certain combinations of symptoms
are treated.
We can also consider interventions where some root-to-sink paths are subject to more than one manipulation. Or we
could modify our deﬁnition of a CEG manipulation to consider interventions which produce possible outcomes at a position
which are not possible in the idle system. This would involve not just imposing a new distribution on existing edges, but the
adding of extra edges and hence the production of extra paths not present in the original CEG. If we enact the intervention
Build a dam across the valley mouth, then the event The village halfway up the valley side gets ﬂooded next year, which has zero
probability in the idle system, now has a probability greater than zero [31].
We have described here how the manipulations of BNs have their counterparts on CEGs. In Section 4 we return to the
more general class of manipulations possible with CEGs. The interventions described above can be thought of as special
cases of these generic types.
4. Identifying the effects of manipulations
Much of the causal BN literature [6,21,20] studies when the effects of a manipulation on a pre-speciﬁed random variable
Y can be identiﬁed from observing a subset of the BN’s variables that are observed or manifest in the idle system. Necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for causal identiﬁability (expressed as functions of the topology of the idle BN) have now been
proved for most scenarios [22,35,7,34]. These results allow us to use probabilities from the idle system in order to estimate
effects on the manipulated system, for example the effects of a proposed new treatment regime.
The topology of the CEG can also be used for this purpose. Pearl [21] states that the causal effect of X on Y is identiﬁable
from a graph G if the quantity p(y ‖ xˆ) can be computed uniquely from any positive probability of the observed variables.
We can generalise this for the CEG and state that the causal effect on a variable Y is identiﬁable from a CEG C if the
probability of the event Y = y in the manipulated CEG Cˆ can be expressed solely in terms of observable probabilities from
the idle system. We can use the topology of the CEG to ﬁnd functions of the data (not just subsets of possible measurements)
that when observed in the idle system allow us to estimate the effect of a given manipulation of a causal CEG. As in [21]
we prove several suﬃcient conditions for identiﬁability, and generalise Pearl’s Back Door Theorem to CEG models. We ﬁrst
provide some notation and a couple of deﬁnitions.
We use λ to indicate a root-to-sink (w0 → w∞) path of our CEG. Each λ is an atom of the path σ -algebra of the CEG,
and the set of atoms is denoted Ω . A subpath of a root-to-sink path is denoted μ or μ(w1,w2), where w1 and w2 indicate
the start and end positions of the subpath.
A union of atoms constitutes an event, denoted Λ. M is used to indicate a union of subpaths, so for example M(w1,w2)
is the union of all subpaths from w1 to w2. Let Λ(w) denote the event which is the union of all paths passing through the
position w , and Λ(e) the union of all paths passing through the edge e. Λ(μ(w1,w2)) is the event which is the union of
all paths utilising the subpath μ(w1,w2).
We use π(w) ≡ π(Λ(w)) to denote the probability of passing through the position w . Note that this is also the prob-
ability of reaching w from w0. The probability of reaching w2 from w1 is denoted by π(Λ(w2) | Λ(w1)) or more simply
π(w2 | w1). Similarly πμ(w2 | w1) ≡ π(Λ(μ(w1,w2)) | Λ(w1)) is the probability of utilising the subpath μ(w1,w2) given
that a unit has reached w1 — this can be thought of as the probability of the subpath μ(w1,w2). Let πe(w2 | w1) denote
the probability of passing from a position w1 to an adjacent position w2 along the edge e(w1,w2).
Finally we let Y : Ω →R be a random variable measurable with respect to the path σ -algebra of the CEG; and let {Λy}
be the partition of Ω generated by Y — namely each Λy is the union of those λ ∈ Ω for which Y = y.
Deﬁnition 5. For a CEG (C,Π(C)), and a manipulation of this CEG yielding a manipulated CEG (Cˆ, Πˆ(Cˆ)), the manipulation
is forced to the position w if:
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2. under Πˆ(Cˆ) all primitive probabilities associated with edges downstream of w are those of the idle system.
A manipulation which forces to a position w is one which ensures that at a speciﬁed point in a process, all units have
the same probability of following each of a set of possible future developments. This is done by arranging that each unit
has the same vector of values for a subset of the preceding variables (characterised by Λ(w)). An example of this would be
a company preparing employees for possible promotion by ensuring that they had each attended certain training courses or
passed certain professional examinations. In Example 3.1, both our manipulations are manipulations forced to a position.
We now consider an effect random variable Yˆ deﬁned on the path σ -algebra of Cˆ . Yˆ generates a partition of the root-
to-sink paths of Cˆ with each outcome corresponding to a union of w0 → w∞ paths. There then exists a variable Y deﬁned
on C such that any path in C which belongs to the event Y = y and which passes through w , has an equivalent path in Cˆ
which belongs to the event Yˆ = y. Without ambiguity we can denote the union of w0 → w∞ paths in Cˆ belonging to the
event Yˆ = y by Λy .
Now each w0 → w∞ path in Cˆ is a conjunction of a w0 → w subpath with a w → w∞ subpath. We denote these
subpaths by {μ(w0,w)} and {μ(w,w∞)} and let the union of all w0 → w subpaths be M(w0,w).
The random variable Yˆ measures an effect after a manipulation forced to w . So heuristically Yˆ needs to be realised after
w , i.e. be associated with events downstream of w . Formally we therefore require that our partition {Λy} of Cˆ consists of
events each of which is M(w0,w) conjoined to a union of subpaths from {μ(w,w∞)} — for outcome Yˆ = y, call this union
My(w,w∞).
Suppose brieﬂy that we are considering a problem which admits a natural product space structure (and could therefore
be depicted by a BN). We can then construct a CEG of the problem where all edges can be labelled with the outcomes of
the problem variables (although we may sometimes choose to construct our CEG so that these variables are encountered in
different orders on different root-to-sink paths). In this case we might well label a subset of edges with for example the
outcome y0. The event Y = y0 would then be the union of all w0 → w∞ paths in C passing through one of these edges.
In the manipulated CEG Cˆ many of these edges will disappear. However those that are left will still be labelled y0, and the
event Yˆ = y0 will be the union of all w0 → w∞ paths in Cˆ passing through one of these edges.
Lemma 1. Providing that the probability of passing through the position w in the idle system is greater than zero, then for all levels y,
under a manipulation forced to w
πˆ (Yˆ = y) = π(Y = y | w)
Proof. The proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix A. 
One consequence of this lemma is that for a manipulation forced to w it may be possible to observe indicators on the
events {Λy ∩Λ(w)} in the unmanipulated system and to identify the effect on Y of the manipulation, using this expression.
However it is not always possible to observe these indicators, even in models that can be described by a CBN. Suppose
instead that we can observe indicators for a set of coarser events. We show below that being able to observe indicators on
the events {Λy ∩ Λ(W )} (where W is some set of positions) can also be suﬃcient for identiﬁability.
Deﬁnition 6. A set of positions W ⊂ V (C) is called C-regular (or simply regular) if
(i) no two positions in W lie on the same directed path of C , and if
(ii) no two positions in W share a parent in V (C).
For any regular set of positions W , the collection of edges lying on w0 → W subpaths can be partitioned into deﬁning,
reﬁning and passive edges as follows:
1. the deﬁning edges of W are those edges lying on w0 → W subpaths which emanate from positions not all of whose
outgoing edges lie on w0 → W subpaths,
2. the reﬁning edges of W are those edges lying on w0 → W subpaths which emanate from positions all of whose
outgoing edges lie on w0 → W subpaths, but not all of whose outgoing edges lie on a w0 → w subpath, for any
individual w ∈ W ,
3. the passive edges of W are those edges lying on w0 → W subpaths which are neither deﬁning nor reﬁning edges.
Deﬁnition 7. For a CEG (C,Π(C)), and a manipulation of this CEG yielding a manipulated CEG (Cˆ, Πˆ(Cˆ)), the manipulation
is forced to the C-regular set W if:
1.
∑
w∈W πˆ (Λ(w)) = 1,
2. under Πˆ(Cˆ) all primitive probabilities associated with edges downstream of any w ∈ W are those of the idle system.
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CEG as manipulations to a regular set of positions.
We now construct an effect random variable associated with a manipulation forced to a C-regular set W . So consider a
random variable Yˆ deﬁned on the path σ -algebra of Cˆ . Each outcome y of Yˆ corresponds to a union of w0 → w∞ paths in
Cˆ (Λy), and we wish Yˆ to be downstream of W . As before, there exists a corresponding variable Y deﬁned on C .
For a position w ∈ W and outcome y, we can specify an event M(w0,w) × My(w,w∞) provided that the set
{μy(w,w∞)} is not empty. We then deﬁne our event Yˆ = y (or Λy) as the union over all w ∈ W of the events
{M(w0,w) × My(w,w∞)}.
We wish to be able to state conditions for the effect of a manipulation forced to a C-regular set of positions W being
determinable directly from probabilities in the idle system. We do this through the idea of an amenable manipulation.
Deﬁnition 8. A regular set of positions W is simple if:
1. all deﬁning edges of W emanate from positions which have only one outgoing edge lying on a w0 → W subpath,
2. all reﬁning edges of W emanate from positions which have only one outgoing edge lying on a w0 → w subpath for
each w ∈ W ,
3. for any w ∈ W , the reﬁning edges on w0 → w subpaths are independent of the deﬁning and passive edges on these
subpaths in the sense that
(a) for each w1 ∈ W and all w2 ∈ W \ w1, and for any μ(w0,w1) subpath, there must exist a μ(w0,w2) subpath
which differs in colour from the μ(w0,w1) subpath only on reﬁning edges,
(b) for each w ∈ W the colouring of the reﬁning edges is the same for each μ(w0,w) subpath.




)= π Rwπ(Λ(W ))
where π Rw is the product of probabilities on the reﬁning edges of W lying on the w0 → w subpaths. A derivation of this
result is given in Appendix A.
Note that in direct analogy with results on causal identiﬁability in BNs, the conditions of this deﬁnition can all be checked
with reference to the topology of the CEG. Condition 3(b) needs a slight modiﬁcation if we have chosen to construct our
CEG so that different paths pass through the problem variables in different orders.
Suppose brieﬂy that a particular problem is regular enough to admit a natural product space structure, and the edges of
our CEG have been labelled with the outcomes of the problem variables. It is then possible to deﬁne passive, reﬁning and
deﬁning variables. The values labelling the deﬁning edges of W correspond to the state of a vector of deﬁning variables D;
the vector of reﬁning variables R deﬁnes the values labelling the reﬁning edges; whilst the vector P deﬁnes the values
labelling the passive edges. In this situation we can express condition 3 as R
 (P,D).
Deﬁnition 9. A manipulation is called amenable forcing to a set W if:
1. the set W is simple in (C,Π),
2. the set W is simple in (Cˆ, Πˆ), and πˆ (Λ(W )) = 1,
3. Π(C) and Πˆ(Cˆ) differ only on the deﬁning edges of W .
Lemma 2. Consider an amenable manipulation forcing to a simple set W . The distribution of Yˆ (as deﬁned above) is identiﬁed from
the probabilities in the unmanipulated system of the events {Y = y,W }, and its probabilities are given by the equation
πˆ (Yˆ = y) = π(Y = y,W )
π(W )
where π(W ) ≡∑w∈W π(Λ(w)), and provided that π(Λ(w)) > 0 ∀w ∈ W .
Proof. The proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix A. 
Example 4.1. Consider the binary BN and corresponding CEG in Fig. 7. The manipulation to the set W = {w7,w9} (equivalent
to the Pearl manipulation Do X = x0) is amenable and satisﬁes Lemma 2.




)= π(c0)∑π(d)π(x0 | d) = π(c0)π(x0)
d
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and similarly for π(Λ(w9)). W here is simple — the deﬁning edges are those labelled x0, the reﬁning edges are labelled c0
and c1, and the passive edges are those labelled d0 and d1. π(Λ(W )) = π(x0), and π Rw7 = π(c0).
The CEG Cˆ for this manipulation differs from C in that w3,w4,w5 and w6 are now all in the same stage; the edges







π(d) × 1= π(c0) × 1
and similarly for πˆ (Λ(w9)). So W is simple in Cˆ . Πˆ differs only on the edges labelled x0, i.e. the deﬁning edges; so this
manipulation is amenable.
Letting Λy be the event Y = y0, we have






π(d) × 1× π(y0 | c, x0) =
∑
c
π(c)π(y0 | c, x0)








d π(d)π(x0 | d)π(y0 | c, x0)∑
c π(c)
∑




π(c)π(y0 | c, x0) = πˆ (Y = y0)
Suppose that our idle CEG can (as in Example 4.1) be represented as a BN, so that in particular deﬁning, reﬁning and
passive variables can be deﬁned. In a CBN, the effect of a manipulation of a variable X on a later variable Y can be identiﬁed
from observing the distribution of the unmanipulated pair (X, Y ) if and only if the vector of unobserved (hidden) variables
H in the system can be partitioned as H= (H1,H2), where
H2 
 (H1, X) and (Y ,H2) 
H1 | X
Returning to the CEG, we learnt in Section 2.2 that for any position w we can write Y (w)
 Z(w) | Λ(w) — i.e. any variable
deﬁned downstream of w is independent of variables deﬁned upstream of w conditioned on the event Λ(w). Now for
w ∈ W (a simple set), Λ(w) can be explicitly characterised simply in terms of the labelling of the deﬁning and reﬁning
edges on w0 → w subpaths. So in this situation Λ(w) can be expressed in terms of the states of the vectors D and R, and
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 Z(w) | Λ(w)}w∈W as Y 
 P | (R,D). Since we
already know that R 
 (P,D), we can deduce that (Y ,R) 
 P | D. Equating H1 above with P, X with D and H2 with R, we
can see that the conditions on the CBN are the same as on the CEG. So Lemma 2 is an exact analogue of this well known
result for causal BNs for the more general class of CEGs. Moreover, the conditions required by Lemma 2 only depend on an
appropriate factorisation of probabilities associated with the manipulated set W .
Using Lauritzen’s [15] terminology and the (sets of) variables X, Y ,H1,H2, we have from expression (3.1) that







Note that (X,H1) 
H2 ⇒ X 
H2 | H1, so we can equate PA(X) with H1, and write










π(h1)π(h2, y | x) = π(y | x)
using (Y ,H2) 
H1 | X .
Under these conditions, manipulating X to x has the same effect on Y as conditioning X to x. Note that in Example 4.1
we can clearly see that C 
 (D, X) and (Y ,C) 
 D | X, so our reﬁning variable is C , our deﬁning variable is X , and D is a
passive variable.
5. A Back Door Theorem for Chain Event Graphs
A key component of causal analysis on BNs is Pearl’s Back Door Theorem [19,21], which owes its derivation in part to
the realisation that many manipulations are impossible, unethical or prohibitively expensive in practice, or may be possible
to enact but some of their effects may be impossible to observe. The Back Door Theorem gives suﬃcient conditions for
identifying the effect on a variable Y of manipulation of a variable X when we are able to observe the values taken by only
a subset Z of the remaining variables in the system. If the set Z is chosen carefully then we can calculate or estimate this
effect from a partially observed idle system.
In this section we produce an analogous theorem that applies a graphical and suﬃcient criterion to a CEG to determine
whether we can identify the effect of a manipulation on a random variable Y from the observation of a random variable Z
(happening before the manipulation in the partial ordering induced by the paths) in the unmanipulated system. The event-
based topology of the CEG allows us to consider a wider class of idle system models, and a wider class of manipulations
of these than is generally possible with a standard BN. Similarly, our random variable Z does not need to correspond to
any ﬁxed subset of the measurement variables of the problem, giving us more ﬂexibility in our search for an appropriate
probability expression.
Before proceeding to this theorem we provide some further notation and a couple of deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 10. For a C-regular set of positions W , the graph CW with vertex set V (CW ), directed edge set Ed(CW ) and
undirected edge set Eu(CW ), is deﬁned by
1. V (CW ) consists of the union of {w•0}, a new root-node, with the set of precisely those positions from V (C) which lie
on a w → w∞ subpath in C , for some w ∈ W .
2. The root-node w•0 is connected by an edge to each w ∈ W . Ed(CW ) consists of the union of the set {e(w•0,w)}w∈W
with the set of precisely those edges from Ed(C) which lie on a w → w∞ subpath in C , for some w ∈ W .
3. Edge-colourings (i.e. edge-probabilities) on w → w∞ subpaths of CW (for w ∈ W ) are retained from C .
4. The edge e(w•0,w) (w ∈ W ) is given the probability π(Λ(w))π(Λ(W )) .
5. If two positions in V (CW ) were connected by an undirected edge in C , then they are connected in CW . Eu(CW ) is the
set of undirected edges in CW .
It is straightforward to show that CW is a CEG.
We now let Z be a random variable observed on C , whose events {Z = z} partition the set of w0 → w∞ paths of C ;
and consider W 1, a ﬁne cut of C such that each event Z = z is precisely the set of w0 → w∞ paths in C passing through
a (speciﬁed) subset of positions from this cut. We can then, without ambiguity, identify each event Z = z with this set of
positions — say W 1z .
Let the set of positions to which we intend to manipulate be W 2. Then for Z to occur before the manipulation we
require that every position w2 ∈ W 2 lies on a path in C between some position w1 ∈ W 1z (for some level z) and w∞ . Note
that our ﬁne cut W 1 is going to take the role of Z in our Back Door Theorem. We therefore require that the manipulation
does not change any primitive probabilities from the idle system lying on a subpath between w0 and the positions in W 1.
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not equal π(Λ(w1)). Having imposed this condition, we can ensure that the probability of Z = z is the same in Cˆ as in C .
Deﬁnition 11. A set of C-regular positions W 2 ⊂ V (C) is called simple conditioned on Z if
1. W 2 ≡⋃z W 2z where W 2z is simple in CW 1z .
2. There is a directed path in C from each position w1z ∈ W 1z through a position w2 ∈ W 2, and W 2z is the set of precisely
those positions in W 2 which lie on a w0 → w1z → w∞ path for some w1z ∈ W 1z .
Note that the union in item 1 is not a disjoint union.
Consider an amenable manipulation to a set W , and let W be simple conditioned on Z . Then Z is called a Back Door
variable to the manipulation. Let our effect variable Yˆ be the image of Y in the manipulated CEG.
Theorem 1. If a set W is simple conditioned on Z (a Back Door variable), then the distribution of Y after an amenable manipulation
to W is identiﬁed from the probabilities (in the idle system) of the events {Y = y, W , Z = z}, and its probabilities are given by:
πˆ (Yˆ = y) =
∑
z
π(Y = y,W , Z = z)
π(W , Z = z) π(Z = z)
Proof. The proof of this theorem is presented in Appendix A. 
Example 5.1. In Example 3.1 we considered a manipulation of the CEG in Fig. 1 to the position w13, where if the police
proceeded the witness was forced not to identify S . Consider now the manipulation wherein the witness is forced to
identify S . This is a manipulation forced to W = {w12,w14}. The manipulated CEG is given in Fig. 8.
Whereas the previous manipulation might have been enacted by an outside manipulator, such as the suspect’s brother,
this intervention is likely to have been enacted by someone within the police force, probably acting in an unethical manner.
They would wish to have a good idea of the effects (on the indicator X6) of this manipulation, but as a consequence of the
improper nature of their intervention, they might not have any means of obtaining reliable estimates of certain necessary
joint distributions of the problem variables. In particular, they would probably have to treat X4 (indicating whether or
not the forensic service will ﬁnd a glass match) as an unobservable variable. Can we produce a manipulated probability
expression which does not depend on X4?
Consider the BNs in Fig. 2 and the use of Pearl’s Back Door Theorem [19,21]. For BN (1) we could use a Back Door
blocking set consisting of X1 with X2 and/or X3, whereas for BNs (2) and (3), any blocking set must include X4. So only
BN (1) is of use to us here. If this BN is supplemented with the relevant context-speciﬁc information then we will be able to
produce an identiﬁable expression. But as noted in Section 2.3, none of the BNs in Fig. 2 are well-deﬁned — none of them
encodes the full set of conditional independence properties of the problem, whereas the problem has an unambiguous
representation as a CEG, and the CEG does not need to be supplemented with extra information. Moreover, we can use
Theorem 1 to deduce the effect on X6 of our manipulation, and produce an expression which is not dependent on X4.
Notice that the probabilities in Cˆ differ only on the deﬁning edges of W (a C-regular set), i.e. on those edges labelled
proceed and identiﬁes S. At ﬁrst sight the manipulation does not seem to satisfy the conditions for Theorem 1 as the manipu-
lated edge proceed must necessarily be upstream of any possible Back Door blocking set we propose. But all w0 → W paths
pass through w1, so πˆ (conviction) = πˆ (conviction | Λ(w1)). This is simply the manipulated probability of conviction in the
CEG Cw1 (see Deﬁnition 10). We can therefore simply consider this CEG Cw1 and apply Theorem 1 to it. W is Cw1 -regular
and the deﬁning, reﬁning and passive edges of W in Cw1 are precisely the deﬁning, reﬁning and passive edges of W in C
which lie downstream of the position w1, so checking the conditions of Theorem 1 can be done on the original graph in
Fig. 1.
The ideas here can be used to allow us to apply Theorem 1 in many situations where, at ﬁrst sight, it is apparently not
appropriate.
Note that our set W 1 need no longer be a ﬁne cut of C , but just one of Cw1 , i.e. a partition of the root-to-sink paths
of Cˆ . So consider the set W 1 = {w5,w6,w7}, upstream of the set W ≡ W 2 = {w12,w14}. Assign the value z = 1 to paths
passing through w5 (stole money); z = 2 to paths passing through w6 (present, did not steal money); z = 3 to paths passing
through w7 (not present). Then W 1z=1 = {w5}, W 1z=2 = {w6}, W 1z=3 = {w7}.
If we let W 2z=1 = W 2z=2 = W 3z=3 = W 2, then by construction, if W 2 is simple in CW 1z for each W 1z , the conditions of
Deﬁnition 11 are satisﬁed and W 2 is simple conditioned on Z (in Cw1 ). We do not need to produce separate graphs for
each CW 1z — we can do all our checking on C in Fig. 1. For each CW 1z the deﬁning edges of W
2 are those labelled identiﬁes S
and the reﬁning edges are those labelled glass match and no match. These edges obey the conditions of Deﬁnition 8, so W 2
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is simple in each CW 1z and hence simple conditioned on Z in Cw1 . Our variable Z , manipulation set W ≡ W 2 and effect
variable Y therefore satisfy the conditions for Theorem 1 with the X6 outcome conviction equating to Y = y.









π(conviction | identiﬁes S, z)π(z)
since the set W corresponds to the event that X5 takes the outcome identiﬁes S.
Note that all primitive probabilities in Cw1 are identical to those in C except the probability on the edge e(w0,w1),
so the probability of z in Cw1 is the probability of z in C divided by π(proceed). Hence in C our manipulated probability
expression is




π(conviction | identiﬁes S, z)π(z)
It is not diﬃcult to check that this formula correctly expresses the causal effect on X6 of our manipulation. Moreover, as
our three positions w5, w6, w7 can be characterised by values of X2 and X3, this expression does not require knowledge
of the distribution of X4 or of joint distributions including X4.
As with BNs, we conjecture that it will be possible to devise simple automated methods for determining whether there
exist variables Z satisfying the conditions for Theorem 1, and procedures for choosing between candidate variables Z . These
methods are as yet not fully developed.
If we believe such a variable does exist, then Example 5.1 shows us that the choosing of the positions within our partition
can be straightforward. We construct the set {W 1z } to satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1, but also to minimise the amount
of work involved. The events {Z = z} must be observable or manifest within the system, but it is not necessary that these
events are actually observed — in Example 5.1 the police do not observe whether the suspect was at the scene or threw the
brick, but they do have what they consider to be reliable estimates for these probabilities. How we assign z values to the
positions depends on the information we have available, so for example we could here assign the value z = 2 to both w6
and w7, and let W 1 = {w6,w7}. W 2 is still simple in this new C 1 , so this new partition also satisﬁes the conditionsz=2 Wz=2
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for Theorem 1. We therefore have a choice of coarser or ﬁner partitions, and which we choose will depend on the structure
of the information we hold on the conditional distributions of X6. If we are able to choose either then we should go for the
coarser partition, as the resulting expression for πˆ (conviction) is simpler.
The updating of the edge-probabilities of our CEG following a manipulation can already be done rapidly and automat-
ically, using algorithms analogous to those described and coded for updating edge-probabilities following an observation
in [33] and [32].
Example 5.2. First year students at the university in Example 3.2 who made the university ﬁrst choice on their application
(Z = 0) are allocated a shared apartment on campus, whilst ﬁrst year students who did not (Z = 1) are lodged in either
town K or in town L (indicator X3). Students lodged in towns K and L may have a friendly landlord or an unfriendly landlord
(indicator U ), and the friendliness of these landlords is not known to the university.
When Z = 0 it is believed that the CEG in Fig. 5 is valid (where here Y is explicitly the satisfaction expressed by the ﬁrst
year student). If Z = 1 the town in which the student is lodged is chosen independently of the ethnicity X2 of the student;
the friendliness of the landlord does not depend on either the town or the ethnicity of the student; but the satisfaction
rating Y expressed by the ﬁrst year student depends both on the friendliness of the landlord and the allocated town. The
problem can be represented by the CEG in Fig. 9.
We wish to consider a proposed manipulation of the allocation policy for next year. The university plans to match
campus-based students so that those sharing an apartment are of the same ethnicity, and to allocate off-campus students
only to lodgings in town L. Our interest is in πˆ (high) — the overall predicted probability of high satisfaction were this policy
to be implemented. The university intends to estimate this probability with a small data set, collected from earlier years.
The manipulation proposed is different for different contingencies, but this is irrelevant when analysing with a CEG.
It can be considered as a manipulation to W = {w6,w11,w13}. If we consider the partition {W 1z } = {{w1}, {w2}}, it is





π(high | z,W )π(z)
= π(high | Z = 0, X1 = X2)π(Z = 0) + π(Y = 1 | Z = 1, town L)π(Z = 1)
So πˆ (high) can be expressed as a function of three probabilities from the idle system — that a student resides on campus;
that a campus-based student sharing with someone of the same ethnicity gives a high satisfaction rating; and that a student
lodging in town L gives a high satisfaction rating. It follows that the probabilities associated with the ethnicity of matched
pairs of campus-based students; the satisfaction ratings of unmatched pairs of campus-based students; the ethnicity of non-
campus-based students; the friendliness of the landlords of non-campus-based students are all irrelevant to this calculation,
and need not be estimated.
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original measurement variables of the problem, but appears naturally in the CEG of Fig. 9, where its outcomes correspond
to the positions w6 and w7.
To summarise — by examining the topology and colouring of an (idle) CEG, it is possible to determine suﬃcient con-
ditions for whether an effect of a causal manipulation can be identiﬁed from a partial set of observations of the system.
The CEG is ideally suited to the causal analysis of models which are highly asymmetric. Also, the search for an appropriate
random variable Z , whose observation ensures identiﬁability, is not restricted to subvectors of the original (non-descendant)
measurement vectors; we can search over all functions of such measurements. Searching over these functions to ﬁnd the
cheapest way of identifying the quantity of interest will often be of much greater value than simply searching over subsets
of measurements. This will be particularly useful if those measurements have not yet been collected, or their parameterisa-
tions have been chosen by convention rather than because they reﬂect some natural description of how a process unfolds.
If an intervention can be identiﬁed via a CEG, then it may well be the case that by imposing a product space on the
problem we will be able to express it as a BN and ﬁnd an identiﬁable expression for the effects of the intervention via this
BN. However, this identiﬁcation will probably require supplementary context-speciﬁc information which is not present in
the DAG of the BN, but which appears naturally in the CEG-representation of the problem.
6. Discussion
We have demonstrated that the CEG provides a ﬂexible graphical framework within which to represent and analyse a
wide variety of causal hypotheses, even in highly asymmetrical domains. There is of course a cost for this ﬂexibility in that
CEGs have, in general, more vertices and edges than BNs. For more symmetric problems this favours BN-based procedures,
but as problems become less symmetric we have found that CEGs become more eﬃcient both in model-storage space and
in the algorithms used for updating probabilities [33]. An analysis of the comparative complexity of CBNs and CEGs is to be
the focus of a future paper.
Of course the Back Door Theorem presented in this paper is not the only topological criterion for determining causal
extensions; for example it is possible to produce and prove analogues of Pearl’s Front Door Theorem (see [31]). In [9]
we have shown that CEGs admit conjugate learning and model selection. Currently under investigation are extensions to
learning CEGs when underlying experiments can be causally manipulated (similar in approach to [14]) — these also often
admit a conjugate analysis. Despite their more complex topology, causal CEGs, being more general and expressive than CBNs,
provide a useful complementary technology.
As with the BN, there are limits to the expressiveness of the CEG, and sometimes issues such as whether a cause can
be identiﬁed can only be addressed algebraically (see [24]). None-the-less, the popularity of the BN has demonstrated the
appeal of graphical-based causal inference, as well as how useful such inference can be. CEGs provide a powerful additional
graphical tool for the investigation of causal structures which are not easily or fully expressible as CBNs.
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Appendix A. Proofs (and Lemma 3)
Proof of Lemma 1. In Cˆ we can express the event Yˆ = y as Λy = M(w0,w)×My(w,w∞) = Λ(w)∩Λ(My(w,w∞)). Hence






= πˆ(Λ(w))πˆMy (w∞ | w) = 1× πMy (w∞ | w)
using Deﬁnition 5(1) and (2).
By deﬁnition of Y on C we have
π(Y = y,w) ≡ π(Λy,Λ(w))= π(Λ(w))πMy (w∞ | w)
⇒ πˆ (Yˆ = y) = [π(Λ(w))]−1π(Λy,Λ(w))= π(Λy ∣∣Λ(w))≡ π(Y = y | w) 
Derivation of result π(Λ(w)) = π Rwπ(Λ(W )). Consider a single subpath μ(w0,w) for w ∈ W . This consists of a set of






))= π Pμπ Dμπ Rμ
where π Pμ is the product of the probabilities on the passive edges of μ (etc.).












Deﬁnition 8(3)(a) implies that for each μ ∈ {μ(w0,w1)}, there is a corresponding μ ∈ {μ(w0,w2)} for which π Pμπ Dμ takes






















By Deﬁnition 6(2) and by construction, the possible combinations of reﬁning edges partition the set of w0 → W subpaths,
so
∑




)= π Rwπ(Λ(W ))




)= π Rwπ(Λ(W ))




)= πˆ Rw πˆ(Λ(W ))= π Rw
using (i) Deﬁnition 9(3), Π(C) and Πˆ(Cˆ) differ only on the deﬁning edges of W (i.e. not on the reﬁning edges of any





In Cˆ , the event Yˆ = y (or Λy) is equal to ⋃w∈W [M(w0,w) × My(w,w∞)]. The corresponding event in C is (Y = y,W ) ≡
Λy ∩ Λ(W ). So















πMy (w∞ | w) using Deﬁnition 7(2)






πMy (w∞ | w)
= [π(Λ(W ))]−1π(Λy,Λ(W ))
= π(Λy ∣∣Λ(W ))≡ π(Y = y,W )
π(W )

Lemma 3. If W 1 and W 2 are C-regular sets of positions, and W 2 is simple in the CEG CW 1 then π(Λ(w
2) | Λ(W 1),Λ(W 2)) can be
written as the product of probabilities on the reﬁning edges of W 2 in C .
Proof. Let w be a position in CW 1 other than its root. By construction of CW 1 , the sub-CEG of CW 1 rooted in w has precisely
the same topology and edge-colouring (i.e. edge-probabilities) as the sub-CEG of C rooted in w .
Suppose the edges leaving w are reﬁning edges of W 2 in CW 1 . Then all edges leaving w are on w
•
0 → w2 ∈ W 2 subpaths
in CW 1 , and hence in C . Also, as W
2 is simple in CW 1 , only one edge leaving w lies on a w
•
0 → w2 subpath in CW 1 for any
individual w2 ∈ W 2. So only one edge leaving w lies on a w0 → w2 subpath in C for any individual w2 ∈ W 2. Hence the
edges leaving w are reﬁning edges in C . The reﬁning edges of W 2 in CW 1 are therefore precisely the reﬁning edges of W
2
in C which lie downstream of W 1.
Let probabilities in CW 1 be denoted π˜ . Then W
2 is simple in CW 1 implies that π˜ (Λ(w
2) | Λ(W 2)) can be expressed as
the product of probabilities on the reﬁning edges of W 2 in CW 1 , and from above can therefore be expressed as the product
of probabilities on the reﬁning edges of W 2 in C . But
























































using Deﬁnition 10(3) and (4)
= [π(Λ(W 1),Λ(W 2))]−1π(Λ(W 1),Λ(w2))
= π(Λ(w2) ∣∣Λ(W 1),Λ(W 2)) 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let W ≡ W 2. W 2 is simple conditioned on Z , so we can express W 2 ≡⋃z W 2z where W 2z is simple in






) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ))= π(Λ(w2) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ),Λ(W 2))π(Λ(W 2) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ))
⇒ πˆ(Λ(w2) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ))= πˆ(Λ(w2) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ),Λ(W 2))πˆ(Λ(W 2) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ))= π(Λ(w2) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ),Λ(W 2))
using (i) Lemma 3, π(Λ(w2) | Λ(W 1z ),Λ(W 2)) can be written as the product of probabilities on the reﬁning edges of
W 2 in C , and Deﬁnition 9(3), Π(C) and Πˆ(Cˆ) differ only on the deﬁning edges of W 2; and (ii) the fact that πˆ (Λ(W 2) |






) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ))= [π(Λ(W 2) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ))]−1π(Λ(w2) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ))
Consider in Cˆ the events:
(Z = z) ≡ Λ(W 1z ) since every w1 ∈ W 1z exists in Cˆ by construction,
(Z = z, Yˆ = y) ≡ Λ(W 1z ) ∩ Λ(W 2) ∩ Λy since in Cˆ all paths pass through W 2.











where M(w0,w1,w2) is the union of all μ(w0,w1,w2) subpaths, and My(w2,w∞) is the union of all μ(w2,w∞) sub-
paths consistent with Yˆ = y. So



















πˆ (Yˆ = y | Z = z) = πˆ(Λ(W 2),Λy ∣∣Λ(W 1z )) (A.1)






























































) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ))]−1π(Λ(w2) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ))πMy (w∞ | w2)
using the above and Deﬁnition 9(3) (or Deﬁnition 7(2))
= [π(Λ(W 2) ∣∣Λ(W 1z ))]−1π(Λ(W 2),Λy ∣∣Λ(W 1z ))
using the equivalence of the entities in expressions (A.1) and (A.2) and removing the hats, which we can do as this proof
has used no aspect of the topology of Cˆ which is not also true for C .
Also, since W 1 is a ﬁne cut, all w0 → w∞ paths in C pass through some w1 ∈ W 1, and by Deﬁnition 11(2) each
w1 ∈ W 1 lies on a w0 → W 2 path. So by Deﬁnition 6(1) no edges leaving positions upstream of W 1 are deﬁning edges of
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))= π(Λ(w1)) ∀w1 ∈ W 1
⇒ πˆ (Z = z) ≡ πˆ(Λ(W 1z ))= π(Λ(W 1z ))≡ π(Z = z)
So
πˆ (Yˆ = y) =
∑
z















π(Y = y,W , Z = z)
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